

# ARMY MISSIONS AND PERFORMANCE

## INTRODUCTION


America's Army exists for the defense of the nation. Its broad missions are set forth in Title 10, United States Code, which states in part:

[The Army] shall be organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations on land... [and] is responsible for the preparation of land forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war except as assigned, and in accordance with integrated mobilization plans, for the expansion of the peacetime components of the Army to meet the needs of war.

The process of preparing its forces to be ready for the effective prosecution of war - ***total force readiness*** - is the Army's principal mission.

The Secretary of the Army is responsible for, and has the authority to conduct, all affairs of the Army. He is assisted by the Chief of Staff of the Army; the Under Secretary of the Army; the Vice Chief of Staff; officials of the Army Secretariat and Army Staff; and the Commanders of the Major Commands, Corps, and Divisions. The map below highlights the Major Army Commands in the United States, a number of which are referred to in this report.

**Major Army Commands in the United States**



### Major Army Commands Overseas

Army commands overseas consist primarily of major forces assigned as ground force components of the U.S. unified commands. The major Army commands overseas and the unified commands to which they are assigned are:

- U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR), assigned to U.S. European Command;
- U.S. Army, Pacific (USAPAC), assigned to U.S. Pacific Command;
- Eighth U.S. Army (EUSA), assigned to U.S. Forces Korea (a unified command of the U.S. Pacific Command); and
- U.S. Army South (USARSO), assigned to U.S. Southern Command.

### Military Forces

The Army's military forces are an integrated organization of the active Army and the reserve components (Army National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve), organized into combat service support units. Combat units include active and National Guard divisions, special operations units, and other combat units assigned to echelons above the division level. Combat service support units provide logistical, communications, medical, transportation, supply, maintenance, and other support essential for combat operations.

### Measuring Performance

America's Army has demonstrated its professionalism, dedication, and readiness repeatedly in recent years, whether responding to foreign aggression and national security threats, supporting peacekeeping operations, providing disaster relief, or aiding in humanitarian efforts. The Army has many effective systems for evaluating readiness, especially the Unit Status Reporting System, which includes a variety of indicators that portray the condition and trends of units Army-wide. A number of these measures appear in the sections that follow. However, (much of this information is classified and can not be disclosed in this type of report.) The Army continues working to develop and implement new and even more effective measures of performance that will provide meaningful assessments of its ability to fulfill its missions.

### The Functional Elements of Readiness

America's Army accomplishes its principal mission of total force readiness when the required force structure is manned with quality personnel; supported with modern equipment and systems; trained and prepared to mobilize and deploy rapidly; and capable of being sustained until military objectives are achieved.

A trained and ready force continues to be the Army's overarching priority, which all other priorities support. The Army Standing Resource Priorities focus on the highest defense priority, readiness and sustainability:

- **Maintain the quality of the Total Force.**
- **Maintain quality of life.**
- **Integrate information-age technologies.**
- **Establish projection platforms to support the future force.**
- **Ensure that the force is mobilized, deployed, sustained.**
- **Optimize modernization to maintain technology superiority.**
- **Provide the framework for the Army missions, goals, and objectives.**



## FORCE STRUCTURE

Army's force structure has met the challenge of undergoing its most significant changes since the end of World War II. Today's force structure, a Continental United States (CONUS)-armored-based power projection land force, is essential for the accomplishment of Army missions in support of the national defense strategy goals. The force structure provides the Army the key element for all readiness planning and other functional components of total force readiness.

The Army force structure supports the National Military Strategy. As the strategy changed to meet the demands of an environment of ever-increasing, unpredictable threats, the supporting Army force structure changed significantly. From FY 1989-1996, the Army active and reserve component military endstrength decreased by approximately 448,000 personnel. While the active component has achieved its objective size, the reserve components will continue to downsize through the end of FY 1998. Throughout this period, the Army has downsized its force while increasing its capability to project forces from locations within CONUS in response to worldwide contingencies. The objective of force structure centers around a contingency force with associated combat support and combat service support. The force will combine elements of various capabilities, permitting tailoring and allowing assignment to any theater. In addition to the CONUS contingency force units, the overseas Army forces retain the flexibility to deploy strategically at any given time.

ARMY YESTERDAY (1989)	CUMULATIVE REDUCTIONS FY 89-96	ARMY TODAY (1996)
5 CORPS 18 AC DIV 10 RC DIV	AC - 275,000 RC - 173,000	4 CORPS 10 AC DIV 8 RC DIV

The current force structure of the Army provides a solid foundation for a transition to Army XXI,

America's land force of the future. The Force XXI Campaign Plan is the concept that the Army will use to manage and exploit anticipated revolutionary changes in technology. Army XXI will be sized and structured appropriately to meet the demands of requirements contained in the National Military Strategy.

As the active component downsized, the Army National Guard (ARNG) and U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) mission requirements continued to increase. To enhance the Army's readiness, the Army National Guard Division Redesign Study (ADRS) examined ways to convert existing low-priority combat units into higher-priority support forces, thus reducing the overall combat support and combat service support shortfalls.

The Bottom-Up Review and National Military Strategy identified the requirements for highly trained and equipped, combat-ready reserve forces to separate our nation's ability to win two near-simultaneous Major Regional Conflicts (MRCs). The 15 Army National Guard Separate Brigades are the combat force with the highest priority to be organized and resourced to train, mobilize, and deploy within 90 days of call-up.

The ARNG Separate Brigades, scheduled to be fully operational by FY 1999, are currently undergoing modernization and extensive training in order to be compatible with active Army divisions. The brigades' readiness capability will allow employment in the fast-evolving regional conflicts expected in the future or to reinforce active units in a crisis.

Reserve component force structure continues to undergo major transition, with the ARNG and USAR each being realigned with their core competencies. The ARNG will maintain its balanced structure of combat, combat support, and combat service support units. The Army Reserve will be aligned with combat service support, combat support, and specialized units. As a result of this realignment, the two reserve components will exchange more

## 12 Overview

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than 10,000 slots of force structure. The unit transfers commenced in FY 1994, with the National Guard receiving responsibility for all reserve component Special Forces. They continued in FY 1996 with the transfer of more than 11,570 slots. Unit transfers are projected for completion in FY 1997.

FY 1996 Force Structure Highlights are described below:

- Military endstrength was reduced to 495,000 in the active component (down 275,000 from FY 1989) and to 603,000 in the reserve component (down 173,000 from FY 1989). With the active component endstrength met, the reserve component will continue toward its goal of 575,000 endstrength by the end of FY 1998.
- The active Army drawdown was completed in FY 1996 with the inactivation and redesignation of the headquarters and divisional units of the 1st Infantry Division (Mech), Fort Riley, KS, and the 4th Infantry Division (Mech), Fort Carson, CO. Reflagging actions have redesignated the 2d Armored Division, Fort Hood, TX, as the 4th Infantry Division (Mech) and the 24th Infantry Division (Mech), Fort Stewart, GA, as the 3d Infantry Division (Mech). The 3d Infantry Division (Mech), stationed in Germany, has been redesignated as the 1st Infantry Division (Mech).



The mission of the manning function is to ensure that the Army has high-quality soldiers and civilians in the proper grade and skill alignments and with the required skills, ability, and experience to perform demanding, complex tasks. Manning includes acquiring personnel, ensuring they receive the proper training and professional development, and assigning them, i.e., *getting the right person in the right place at the right time with the right skills*

- The two maneuver brigades at Fort Riley are aligned with divisions in Germany (3d Brigade of the 1st Infantry Division (Mech) and 3d Brigade of the 1st Armored Division). One of the two divisional maneuver brigades at Fort Carson inactivated. The brigade remaining at Fort Carson was redesignated as 3d Brigade of the 4th Infantry Division (Mech) at Fort Hood, TX.



Force planning is a complex, interrelated series of analyses to develop the optimum force composition necessary to counter assessed threats.

Manning the Army continues to be complicated by redefining roles and missions, by force deployments, and by the challenges of affordability and base closure/realignment actions, all while the Army is executing the force drawdown. Even in this environment, Army goals and objectives remain constant.

### Goals, Objectives, and Performance Measures

#### **Goal: *Manning the force with quality personnel***

Army manpower requirements, total personnel needed by skill and grade, are defined by the force structure. When the required structure is fully manned with quality personnel trained in the appropriate skills, total force readiness is directly supported. The Army is only as good as its people. Key actions in support of this goal include:

## MANNING

- Continue a recruiting strategy that offers the necessary incentive packages, educational programs, and resources to provide quality accessions for the Army.
- Sustain second lieutenant and civilian intern production in numbers and academic disciplines required by the Army.
- Provide compensation, educational, and transition management programs that contribute to maintaining a quality force.
- Provide confident, competent leaders through quality leadership and executive development programs.
- Emphasize equal opportunity, equal employment opportunity, and affirmative action programs. Maintain an environment free of harassment and discrimination.
- Maintain high-quality-of-life programs to meet the needs of the force.
- Maintain personnel readiness, mobilization, deployment, and reconstitution capabilities in support of the National Military Strategy.

**Objective:** *Provide quality nonprior service accessions for America's Army*

**Measure:** Percentage of high school diploma graduates The Army establishes annual goals for the percentage of nonprior service (NPS) accessions (first-time enlistees) who are high school diploma graduates.

**Nonprior Service (NPS) Accessions-  
Percentage of High School Diploma Graduates**

	FY 94	FY 95	FY 96
<b>Active Component</b>			
Total NPS Accessions (000)	60	57	70
Goal - High School Graduates	95%	95%	95%
Actual - High School Graduates	95%	96%	95%
<b>Army National Guard</b>			
Total NPS Accessions (000)	23	21	24
Goal - High School Graduates	94%	95%	95%
Actual - High School Graduates	85%	82%	82%
<b>US Army Reserve</b>			
Total NPS Accessions (000)	19	19	19
Goal - High School Graduates	95%	95%	95%
Actual - High School Graduates	95%	95%	95%

**Measure:** Percentage of Armed Forces Qualification Test Category IV The Army establishes annual goals for the maximum percentage of accessions that should score in the lowest category (Category IV) of the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT).

**Percentage Armed Forces Qualification Test  
Category IV**

	FY 94	FY 95	FY 96
<b>Active Component</b>			
Goal - AFQT Cat IV	2%	2%	2%
Actual - AFQT Cat IV	2%	2%	1%
<b>Army National Guard</b>			
Goal - AFQT Cat IV	2%	2%	2%
Actual - AFQT Cat IV	2%	2%	1.7%
<b>US Army Reserve</b>			
Goal - AFQT Cat IV	2%	2%	2%
Actual - AFQT Cat IV	2%	2%	2%


**Results:** The active component and Army Reserve met all quality marks for NPS enlisted accessions. The Army National Guard fell short of the goal for high school diploma graduates, but met the goal for AFQT Category IV. However, when alternative credential holders are included, ARNG is at 100 percent high school graduates.

**Objective:** *Retain quality soldiers.*

**Measure:** Achievement of retention goals Retaining quality soldiers is key to maintaining strong personnel readiness.

**Results:** Overall, the active component achieved 99.9 percent of its FY 1996 retention goals. Soldiers who re-enlisted in FY 1996 are the same high caliber individuals who enlisted 3 or 4 years ago. Nearly 82 percent of the initial term soldiers re-enlisting in the active Army had general test scores over 100. This is a good indicator of the quality of the Army's future noncommissioned officer corps.

**FY 96 Active Army Re-enlistments**



**Objective:** *Sustain active component commissioned officer production in numbers, academic disciplines, and grades required by America's Army*

**Measure:** Number of accessions needed to minimize deviation between force structure allowances and operating strength

**Active Duty Officer Accessions Needed to Minimize  
Force Structure  
vs. Operating Strength Deviation**

	FY 94	FY 95	FY 96
Planned	5,504	5,881	5,334
Actual	5,855	5,840	5,212

**Results:** As we come out of the drawdown and move toward a steady-state endstrength, accessions planning should stabilize. The accession mission will still be sensitive to uncertainty associated with losses and future force structure changes.



Modernization is the process of integrating new doctrine, organization, training, leader development, and materiel to develop and field warfighting capabilities for the Force Projection Army. A state of continuous modernization exists if the following condition holds: For every class of major weapon system (e.g., main battle tank, attack helicopter, truck) within the Army's warfighting structure, there is either a system in production, an upgrade of the system in progress, or a technologically superior replacement of the system in development.

Continuous modernization is vital to total force readiness. Today's technological advances (digital communication, high-speed computer processors, fiber optics, etc.) are integrated into evolving military doctrine, organization, force mix, tactics, and methods of control and communication. As the Army of the 21st century, Army XXI, emerges, the Army continues to implement a strategy to deliver all aspects of force modernization to the battlefield of the future. This strategy reflects today's decreasing resources by emphasizing technology integration and improvement of existing systems. Procurement of new systems is limited; extending the lives and upgrading the capabilities of existing systems, while retaining the technology edge, is paramount.

***Modernization is a continuous process essential to ensure that the Army is capable of successfully responding to our Nation's needs today and in the future.***

## Acquisition and Fielding

### Modernization Objectives and Key Capabilities

The soldier remains the key to American victory in war. Quick, decisive victory requires land force dominance. To achieve land force dominance with a diminishing force, the Army must develop and maintain overmatching technological capabilities through continuous modernization. The Army's modernization strategy is built on five objectives that prescribe capabilities to achieve land force dominance, provide an all-system view and analysis of the battlefield, and emphasize the interactive and interdependent nature of the required capabilities. Hence, most Army weapon systems and programs provide capabilities that support at least two of the objectives. The modernization objectives, and supporting systems, are described below.

#### 1. ***Project and Sustain the Force.***

America's Army is primarily a Continental U.S.-based force. Today's environment demands, and future environments will demand, the capabilities to project CONUS-based forces quickly and sustain those forces for extended periods of time. The Army is making improvements in this area by prepositioning War Reserves, upgrading CONUS infrastructure, and continuing support for both the Air Force C-17 and the Navy Large, Medium-Speed, Roll-on/Roll-off Ship (LMSR). The following are selected systems that enable the Army to project and sustain the force: Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles (FMTV), Palletized Load

## MODERNIZATION

### Research & Development,




System (PLS) trucks and trailers, Family of Heavy Tactical Vehicles (FHTV), CH-47D Cargo Helicopter, and Combat Service Support Control System (CSSCS).

**2. Protect the Force.** Although our soldiers are vulnerable during all phases of operations, they are most vulnerable during initial, forced entry into hostile areas. The Army has made some improvements in reducing the threat from theater ballistic and cruise missiles and corresponding nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) threat. The systems that enable the Army to protect the force include: Patriot, Avenger, JSTARs' ground station, and the Fox NBC reconnaissance vehicle.

**3. Win the Information War.** Information warfare capabilities harness advances in information technologies in order to collect, process, disseminate, and use information. The goal is to give Army XXI the operational advantages of information dominance. The Army has started fielding a robust sensor and communication capability to win the information war. Some of the systems that contribute to information dominance are: MILSTAR, Guardrail Common Sensor (GRCS), All Source Analysis System (ASAS), Tactical Internet, and Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities (TENCAP).

**4. Conduct Precision Strikes.** To shape the battle space, the Army XXI commander must have a rapidly deployable capability to conduct deep attacks against the threat. To attack successfully, the Army has made progress in attacking targets with precision at extended ranges and developing the capability to see deep, find high-payoff targets, and transmit that information in near real time to firing units employing advanced weapons and munitions systems to destroy those targets. Systems that shape the battle space are the Multiple Launched Rocket System (MLRS) Improved Fire Control System and launcher, Search and Destroy Armor (SADARM) munitions, and Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS).

**5. Dominate the Maneuver Battle.** The Army must be able to control and dominate the fight in order to achieve swift, decisive victory with minimum casualties. Modernization of the maneuver forces is making them more deployable, tailorable, and lethal. This allows maneuver forces to get to the area of operations. Once there, they must have the versatility to function in both war and military operations other than war. Equipment key to dominating the fight include: M1A2 Abrams Main Battle Tank, M2A3 Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle, Javelin Anti-tank Missile System, night vision devices, and the Long-Range Advanced Scout Surveillance System.



Achievement of the five modernization objectives across the battlefield is a function of the Army's ability to protect and enhance those weapon systems that deliver four key modernization capabilities: (1) *night vision*, achieved through the 2nd Gen Forward-Looking Infrared (FLIR) thermal night vision device; (2) *digitization of the battlefield*, achieved through horizontal integration of digital communications, command and control (C3) technologies in maneuver, fire support, air defense, intelligence and aviation weapon platforms; (3) *smart munitions* which, after launch, require no operator for target engagement; and (4) "*deep fires*," i.e., the ability to strike deep; deep attack weapon systems include ATACMS, the Comanche advanced armed reconnaissance helicopter, and the AH-64D Longbow attack helicopter.

The night vision capability advances, primarily, the "Project and Sustain the Force" and "Dominate the Maneuver Battle" modernization objectives. Digitization of the battlefield



advances “Protect the Force,” “Win the Information War,” “Conduct Precision Strikes” and “Dominate the Maneuver Battle.” Smart munitions and deep fires provide their greatest contribution to the “Protect the Force” and “Conduct Precision Strikes” objectives.

### Horizontal Technology Integration

Fiscal constraints, the rate of technological advances, acquisition reform and manufacturing improvements have significantly changed the Army’s modernization strategy. When a technology is identified as providing a significant capability improvement, it may be incorporated in dissimilar existing platforms that operate together. The horizontal technology integration (HTI) may be in new acquisitions, product improvements, or system component improvements. While this strategy accepts some risk, it greatly reduces the expense from a total recapitalization strategy and takes maximum advantage of expenditures for previously fielded systems. HTI is currently directed toward three of the key modernization capabilities Second-Generation Forward Looking Infrared (2nd Gen FLIR), battlefield combat identification, and digitization of the battlefield.

### Executing Force Modernization


Modernization is executed by “force package.” Each force package is a discrete grouping of fighting units ordered by war-fighting priority. The Army has designated four force packages to which units are assigned according to their mission and potential for deployment. As modernized equipment is fielded to units in a given force package, the useful equipment it replaces “cascades” to the next force package. Priority for modernization, therefore, goes to units in a first-to-fight sequence.

Affordability compels the Army to limit modernization to the core force Package 1 (FP1). If procurement continues its current downward trend (see chart), modernization will be confined to a shrinking subset of the first-to-fight units, while the equally undesirable alternative of procuring at uneconomical rates becomes the practice. If fewer pieces of equipment continue to cascade to the next force package, more and more outdated, hard-to-maintain equipment, near or beyond its life service, will remain in units awaiting replacement from higher force package stocks.

### Conclusion

To modernize the force, the Army must develop, produce, and field mission-capable equipment and materiel and be able to evaluate the performance of systems once in operation. Each system must provide added value—a degree of superiority which contributes measurably to Army readiness and mission accomplishment.

**Army Research, Development and Acquisition Funding FY 1985-1996**



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